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Introduction 
This report provides an overview on the state, trajectory and management of the transformation 
processes in the 13 CIS countries plus Mongolia. It is based on the results of the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) and the underlying country assessments which analyze each 
individual country in detail.  
While post-communist Mongolia is generally referred to as an unexpected “success” of 
transformation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remains a politically volatile 
region. This said two opposing trends of political development have characterized the region in 
the past three years (2003-2005). While democratic transformation has exhausted itself in most of 
the countries and the ruling regimes are trying ever harder to stem democratic development, in 
two states—Georgia and Ukraine—social uprisings led to regime change with some potential for 
stable democracy. The “revolutions” in these two states, like the unrest in Uzbekistan and mass 
protests in Kyrgyzstan, signal that political regimes in the CIS remain unstable. Political, ethno-
religious, and social tensions are latent or even virulent in most area countries. Thus, further 
regime crises as in Georgia and the Ukraine cannot be ruled out, especially since the “Revolution 
of the Roses” in Georgia and Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” impact other societies in the region 
and cause concerns among autocratic leaders in the region.  
Even though these two cases differ in crucial respects, they lend themselves to observations that 
capture the region’s broader trends. Regime change in both countries was initiated by clumsy 
manipulated elections. While domestic support for Georgia’s President Shevardnadze had 
already dramatically eroded prior to the elections, the ruling clique in the Ukraine enjoyed strong 
support in the industrialized East of the country, and therefore secession briefly appeared 
possible. In both Georgia and Ukraine, the population resisted being deprived of their 
fundamental democratic rights. Their protests also expressed massive frustration over corruption, 
social inequity and human rights violations. It was skillfully-led mass movements—and not 
subversive agents controlled by the West—that brought about change and prevented the 
outbreak of mass-violence.  
On the other hand, Russia is regressing more and more from the gray zone of a “defective 
democracy” into some form of neo-authoritarian order. Freedom of the press, plurality of the 
media and freedom of expression have withered due to state intervention. The Khodorkovsky trial 
demonstrates the eroding status of the rule of law and judicial independence. Although the Putin-
government is suggesting that a political solution to the war in Chechnya is at hand, an end to the 
violence appears unlikely in foreseeable future.  
The autocracies of Central Asia have felt the shock waves of the “Revolution of the Roses” 
especially acutely. Apparently, Kyrgyzstan was most affected. However, the end of the regime of 
President Akayev differed fundamentally from the breakdown of the ancient regimes in Georgia 
and Ukraine. The mass protests in Kyrgyzstan were undisciplined, spontaneous, and the 
fractured opposition movement lacked a common strategy about how the very aim of the protests. 
It remains to be seen in which direction the Kyrgyz’s path of transformation will lead the country 
lead and whether, in retrospect, the protests of 2005 have really marked the beginning of a 
meaningful transition to democracy. Furthermore, upcoming elections in other area countries 
such as Azerbaijan will demonstrate whether competitive autocracies in CIS have a real chance 
to stand against pressure from domestic opposition.  
Aside from Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, a trend toward stronger authoritarianism is 
apparent in Central Asia. This is especially true for Uzbekistan, where religious radicalization, 
deepening unrest and the ruthless suppression of opposition by the government of President 
Karimov’s climaxed in the large-scale use of violence against protestors in Andijan in May 2005.  
The divergent trends in the region continue in the economic dimension of transformation. While 
the budget deficit rose substantially in those countries that are poor in natural resources, which 
further restricted their governments’ scope of action for reforms, Russia and Kazakhstan 
exploited the petroleum boom to introduce structural reforms and invest in special funds for 
harder times. With the exception of these two countries, economic growth in this region has yet to 
affect the level of socioeconomic development. While the quality of human life has not 
dramatically deteriorated in recent years, the divide between rich and poor is widening in most 
societies. Simultaneously, both income inequality and unemployment are rising, particularly in 
central Asia with the exception of Kazakhstan.  
Economic growth is based for the most part on favorable commodity prices, and less so on 
improved institutional frameworks or effective structural measures, which have been seriously 
pursued only in the Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Russia. This obscures a 
fundamental obstacle to solid and stable growth rates in the region: the inadequate diversification 
of most economies, their reliance on natural resources and the production of consumer goods, 
and their attendant dependence on the positive alignment of external parameters such as world 
market prices for petroleum, natural gas and other raw materials. Moreover, even the countries 
that are structurally advanced and resource-rich face serious challenges: reforming inefficient 
administrations, fighting rampant corruption, addressing the degradation of legal standards and 
administrative credibility, modernizing an undercapitalized and poorly differentiated banking 
sector, and rebuilding crumbling social, educational and health systems which are exacerbating 
social exclusion rather than contributing to the sustainability of economic development in the 
region. 
Democratic Development 
Notwithstanding recent gains in democratization in Georgia and Ukraine the CIS remains one of 
the least democratic regions in the world. Aside from Georgia and the Ukraine, the region has 
made no substantial progress toward democratization. In most states, providing political stability 
and the preservation of power take priority over democratic liberalization. Consequently, 
significant deficiencies of democratic transformation such as weak stateness, poor rule of law, 
weak mechanism of political and social integration, remain crucial problems of political 
development in the region.  
Five political regimes in the CIS and Central Asia can be characterized as defective democracies: 
Armenia, Georgia, the Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Mongolia. Within this group, Georgia and 
Ukraine now have a real chance to advance democratic consolidation. Mongolia is following this 
path slowly but steadily, but will continue to rely on massive external support due to the country’s 
economic vulnerability. Putin’s “guided democracy” is increasingly taking on the contours of an 
authoritarian system. In the region’s consolidated autocracies, too, there is an upsurge in 
authoritarian tendencies to control and exclude the opposition. Such tactics are used with rising 
frequency, in order to prevent contagion effects of the democratic revolutions in Georgia and the 
Ukraine. 
Table 1: Quality of Democracy in the CIS/Mongolia 
Defective Democracies  Highly Defective 
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Note: The table follows the BTI data. The countries are listed according to their democracy scores. 
In many area countries, the state’s monopoly on the use of force does not cover the entire 
national territory. States that are especially afflicted by ongoing secession conflicts are Georgia 
(South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Adzharia), Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh), Moldova 
(Transnistria) and Russia (Chechnya, but also increasingly in the entire Northern Caucasus). In 
Kyrgyzstan, the Akajev regime collapsed rapidly in March 2005 after nationwide protests. 
However, most observers were surprised at the speed with which the government lost control of 
the situation. This suggests that the erosion of the state’s monopoly on the use of force had 
actually begun much earlier and the regime was far more crippled than had been assumed by 
most external experts. After further erosion this year, consolidating the state’s monopoly on the 
use of force is one of the most crucial tasks of the new government.  
Following President Saakashvili declaration, that his highest priority was restoring territorial 
integrity by reintegrating breakaway regions into Georgia the nation, the peaceful end to 
Abashidze’s rule in Adzharia raised hopes that the separatist conflicts with South Ossetia and 
Adzharia may also be settled. However, up to now these hopes have been dashed. Rather, the 
Georgian leadership’s efforts to stem smuggling and crime in the secessionist regions even led to 
a brief escalation of violence in South Ossetia. The close relationship between efforts to restore 
territorial integrity and the drive toward democratic consolidation of “core Georgia” by curbing 
corruption and regulating the informal economy speaks against a quick fix of these conflicts, as 
does the deeply-rooted mistrust against Georgia among the populations and leaders in the 
separatist republics.  
State- and nation-building continue to progress slowly in Tajikistan following its civil war (1992 to 
1997). However, as in most other states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, the regionalist and 
particularistic clans and oligarchs continue to subvert the authority of the central government. 
Public administrations often do not function efficiently, and their ability to perform well is restricted 
by over-bureaucratization, endemic corruption, insufficient funding, and politicization of the 
bureaucracy by opposing political factions.  
Elections are held regularly in all countries. However, during the review period the only elections 
that satisfied international standards and could be classified as largely free and fair, according to 
the reports of international election monitors, were those in Mongolia, Georgia, Moldova, and the 
second presidential run-off in Ukraine.  
It is surely remarkable that in a region where especially the hybrid regimes have virtually 
perfected ever more subtle forms of direct and indirect election manipulation in recent years, 
fraudulent elections became the catalyst for peaceful regime changes. The regime changes in 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine accordingly provoked deep uncertainty among the autocratic 
rulers of the region’s other states. In Central Asia, where a series of elections took place in 2004 
and 2005, power elites reacted fiercely to a potential snowball effect of the events in Georgia and 
the Ukraine. For example, Uzbek and Kazakh authorities introduced stiff restrictions on 
international non-governmental organizations and discredited the opposition by portraying it as a 
fifth column of Western geopolitical expansion in the post-Soviet area.  
At the same time, it became clear that protest against manipulated elections alone would not 
suffice a new wave of democratization in the CIS. Rather, structural conditions—which vary 
widely in the region—would tip the scales. The decisive factors in peaceful regime change are the 
extent to which people can be mobilized, the vigor of civil society, the degree to which the 
opposition is organized, and the unity of the ruling elite. This is strongly underscored by the fact 
that the elections in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were not accompanied by major 
protests, irrespective of the degree of manipulation.  
In most of the countries, freedom of association and assembly for civic groups and NGOs is 
constitutionally guaranteed. However, the state often directly or indirectly obstructs the formation 
and work of various groups and political groups in particular. The regimes that most strongly 
repress groups critical of the government are those in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In Tajikistan, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, too, freedom of assembly is systematically violated and the founding of 
oppositional groups forbidden. In many countries it is not weak legal protections but informally 
applied pressure that is the basis for state obstruction of civic groups. Disobliging NGOs must 
reckon with extensive controls by state authorities (tax audits, confiscation of documents, 
sanctions or penalties).  
In nearly the entire region, state control and intimidation of the media encroach upon freedom of 
opinion and freedom of the press to an alarming degree. Economic and political pressure on 
private media and the arbitrary issuance or revocation of state licenses for media companies 
have an extremely negative impact on the plurality of the media landscape. Time and again, 
journalists have been censored and physically attacked. The exceptions to this are Mongolia 
and—since their peaceful revolutions—Ukraine and Georgia, where coverage of the protests 
decisively contributed to the opposition’s victory. In both of these states, reform of the press laws 
is necessary in order to ensure a lasting trend toward greater freedom of the press and plurality of 
the media.  
Only in Georgia, Ukraine and Mongolia is the rule of law strengthened, albeit with limitations. The 
region’s record of granting civil rights does look somewhat more positive, on balance. However, 
only in Mongolia they are fully guaranteed. In Ukraine and Georgia, there is at least an 
opportunity and the political will to lift existing restrictions. In most of the CIS states, the 
presidents’ political hegemony significantly limits the separation of powers, even where it is 
guaranteed by the constitution. Completely dependent on the president, governments often only 
have limited accountability to the parliament. Horizontal accountability of the executive is further 
restricted where the ruling party enjoys a strong majority in parliament, as in Russia, Georgia and 
Moldova. Since most judges are likewise appointed by the president, the judiciary is largely 
subordinated to the executive in practice. Judicial authority can fulfill its corrective function only to 
a very limited extent, because it is often subordinated to political authorities or powerfully 
constrained by functional deficiencies (corruption, insufficient funding and inadequate training). In 
Georgia, recent constitutional changes have strengthened the position of the government, while 
in the Ukraine, political reforms that were already decided by the previous government strengthen 
the position of the parliament vis-à-vis the executive branch.  
Corruption and abuse of office are major problem in the entire region. Governments’ anti-
corruption rhetoric often serves to eliminate political opponents. In Georgia, President Saakashvili 
has declared the fight against corruption to be the top priority of his government. So far, resolute 
action against cases of corruption and salary raises for public servants has begun to bring results, 
although even here, state authorities are sometimes accused of applying the law selectively for 
political reasons.  
In most countries, political parties, interest groups and civic organizations do not fulfill the function 
of promoting political and social integration, or do so only in a very limited way. A stable party 
system anchored in society with the broad consent of the people has been unable to emerge 
anywhere except in Armenia and Mongolia. As a result, the level of party fragmentation and 
electoral volatility remain high. Organizations of interest intermediation and civic organizations 
have also scarcely exerted any political influence, so far. In Georgia and Ukraine, NGOs 
succeeded in channeling the people’s social discontent and effecting peaceful change. However, 
since the “Revolution of the Roses” many of the most active members of civil society in Georgia 
have joined the government, which has led to a veritable brain drain among the NGOs.  
In the states for which opinion poll results are available, public support for democracy is high, in 
principle. However, when ask about the importance of democratic principles, central elements of 
democracy—such as elections, freedom of opinion or participation—regularly come in last. 
Economic Development 
Not a single state in this region has a fully functional, socially responsible market economy. All in 
all, only moderate progress can be seen in market economy transformation. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia and Russia are the regional frontrunners in the BTI 2006. Their comparatively high 
growth rates continued during the study period; but especially in the resource-rich countries, this 
is due to favorable global economic conditions. Their high growth rates must not obscure the fact 
that most economies started at an extremely low level.  
In average, economic growth rates in the past couple of years were very high in global 
comparison: in the CIS states (without Mongolia) it reached 7.8 in 2004, the highest level since 
2000. Growth was especially strong in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia. The region 
profited from favorable global economic conditions and, in the case of the resource-rich states, 
from sustained high commodity prices.  
The greatest risks for the region’s resource-rich countries lie precisely in their dependence on 
natural resources. Although these countries have been able to book substantial budget surpluses 
because of sustained high commodity prices, they remain vulnerable due to the price fluctuations 
that typify the raw materials sector. In addition, their resources richness hampers the willingness 
to implement necessary structural reforms. Commodity prices affect the resource-poor countries, 
as well. They suffer from high oil prices; in addition, most of them are highly dependent on Russia 
as an export market and thus on a rising Russian demand for exports. Only the expansion and 
diversification of regional trade could reduce these vulnerabilities in the long run.  
In those countries where fundamental market reforms have yet to be undertaken—Belarus, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—the macroeconomic indicators also point to sustained economic 
growth. The credibility of official statistics remains extremely questionable in these states, 
however, so that international financial organizations estimate real growth to be much weaker. 
Especially in these states, the sustainability of growth remains doubtful, too. Turkmenistan, and to 
a lesser extent Uzbekistan, benefit from their richness in natural resources. Belarus has a heavily 
subsidized consumer goods industry.  
It is typical for the specific economic systems of the CIS region, that networks and cooperative 
relationships often carry on old power structures or—as in the Caucasus and Central Asia—arise 
from clan relationships. On the one hand, they have been able to avert the often-predicted total 
collapse. On the other hand, institutional stalemates, particularistic interests, and short-term 
profit-seeking have long blocked overdue modernization and thus thwarted a self-supporting 
economic upturn. The omnipresent, rampant corruption is an enormous barrier to the 
implementation of reforms.  
Some countries have used their sustained economic growth to fight rampant poverty (Russia, 
Mongolia). However, in large parts of the region growth has yet to make a sufficient impact on 
socioeconomic conditions. The social services that remain available today are scarcely adequate 
to cover basic needs. Education and science, which were once outstanding, suffer from drastic 
lack of funding, as does the health system. Access to education and skilled medical care is 
increasingly controlled by money. In hardly any other region of the world has HIV spread as 
quickly as in the CIS. Money for HIV education campaigns is lacking, but so is a political 
understanding of their necessity. The erosion of the public education sector continues to raise 
alarms. The once-high educational potential is dwindling throughout the region due to a large 
exodus of well-trained skilled workers and chronic crisis in all areas of education.  
In all of the countries, the Human Development Index has hardly changed since 1995. However, 
the gap between rich and poor is widening everywhere. Chances for advancement depend on 
belonging to networks. In Central Asia, ancestry and clan membership increasingly determine 
access to social and economic opportunity. Poverty is spreading, especially in rural areas, and is 
increasingly taking on a gender component. 
Transformation Management  
Transformation management in the region as a whole has not improved significantly during the 
period under review (2003-2005). The region’s overall scores do not indicate a regional shift 
toward democracy and a market economy. Transformation management is stagnating at a 
relatively low level. Transformation efforts remain directed primarily at the economy. However, 
successes in this area are often offset by a deteriorating or continually weak commitment to the 
democratization process.  
Table 2: Quality of Transformation Management  
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The table follows the BTI data. The countries are listed according to their scores in the 
Management Index.  
However, a closer look at the individual countries reveals new dynamics. While Georgia may be 
the region’s shooting star in transformation management, Russia represents its opposite. 
Generally weak and significantly weaker in resource efficiency and consensus-building, Russia 
has suffered a considerable downward slide. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan show slight 
improvements with dramatic weaknesses in democratization. With a clear focus on economic 
concerns, Kazakhstan has demonstrated improved steering capability, resource efficiency and 
consensus-building.  
Commitment to international cooperation is significantly above the regional average in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. However, with low levels of development and lacking resources, it must be noted 
that both countries are dependent on international support.  
Apart from structural difficulties such as problems of stateness (above all in Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), these countries are burdened as well by very weak 
traditions of civil society. Tajikistan has the highest level of difficulty. Political leadership in 
steering the country toward a market economy and democracy is structurally constrained due to a 
very low level of development, poverty of resources, a disintegrating infrastructure and 
unfavorable geographical and topographical conditions. Society is as divided as the country’s 
topography and regionalist currents pose an obstacle to state coherence. Seven years after the 
civil war’s end (1992-1998), Tajikistan has yet to establish stable institutions for a peaceful 
settlement of conflicts between regional, religious and secular groups. 
Steering Capability  
Bad performance in steering capability is symptomatic of the region’s overall performance in the 
management index. The entire region, with the exception of Georgia and Russia, is stagnating at 
a low level: Georgia and its dynamic rise contrasts with Russia’s downward slide. Belarus, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan consistently demonstrate the weakest performance.  
Georgia shows significant improvements in all sub-indicators, but particularly in setting strategic 
priorities. The Saakashvili government succeeded in rapidly consolidating its governance capacity. 
It not only formulated an ambitious reform agenda, but also undertook decisive steps to 
implement them. For example, the autonomous Republic of Adzharia, driven to a breakaway 
republic by President Abashidze, was economically reintegrated after Abashidze’s peaceful 
removal, which had a positive impact on national tax revenues. Despite democratic shortcomings 
in their implementation, these measures were consistent with the goals of democratic 
consolidation and increased efficiency of government structures. Nevertheless, Georgia has yet 
to formulate a convincing strategy for economic development. Armenia and Ukraine’s relatively 
good scores could have been higher if their political leaders had served less short-term interests, 
especially those of so-called oligarchic and informal clan structures.  
With a generally moderate score for ‘flexibility, learning and policy innovation,’ Russia lies 
significantly below the regional average. Russia’s executive has especially demonstrated its 
capacity for learning in organizing political decision-making processes at the expenses of 
democratic quality. 
Resource Efficiency  
This management category is the region’s weakest. This can be attributed in large part to the lack 
of commitment in the region to fighting endemic corruption. Indeed, of all the sub-indicators, the 
fight against corruption is the region’s absolute weak point. Only Georgia and Belarus merit 
reasonably good scores here. In Belarus, curbing corruption remains a pillar of legitimacy for the 
regime of President Lukashenko, though it is increasingly used as a weapon wielded against 
political opponents. Georgia’s new government also faces similar criticism. Based on a three-
pronged strategy of penalization, incentives to legalize economic activities, and wage increases 
to curb bribe acceptance among state employees, the government’s anti-corruption policy has 
met with broad success.  
In addition to deficiencies in bureaucratic efficiency and curbing corruption—which are 
symptomatic of the region—Russia’s weaker performance as compared to the BTI 2003 can be 
attributed to a deep division between politicians with a secret service background and liberal 
reformers increasingly marginalized by the former. In general, both groups share the president’s 
objectives. However, the rifts between them are massive when deciding how to go about 
achieving these goals. 
Consensus-Building  
Mongolia and Georgia, with Armenia and Ukraine following, received the highest scores in the 
core elements of this category. These core elements include building consensus over long-term 
democratic and economic development, resolving political cleavages and promoting social trust. 
Mongolia continues to illustrate that economically weak countries in the region can enjoy a 
general, stable consensus on democracy and market economy. In Georgia, the stability provided 
by widespread consensus currently enjoyed by President Saakashvili and his government might 
be not permanent. Should Georgia suffer setbacks in economic development and political 
integration, this consensus could crumble.  
Political management in most of the region’s countries reveals the commitment to market 
economy and especially democratic reform as mere rhetoric. Georgia and—since the end of 
2004—Ukraine prove exceptions. Similar to fighting corruption, the regional average scores for 
building social trust and the participatory involvement of civil society are also weak.  
Throughout the region, government relations with civil society groups are characterized by 
distrust. Even in Georgia, where the new government was made up largely of recruits from NGOs, 
relations between civil society and the state have deteriorated somewhat. Kyrgyzstan performed 
relatively well, as its civil society organizations—which are relatively active by Central Asian 
standards—have been included in the political process, particularly at the local level through 
hearings. In Uzbekistan by contrast, potential purveyors of social trust such as traditional 
neighborhood communities (“mahallas”), have been instrumentalized for state purposes. 
Turkmenistan’s scores are low almost across the board. President Niyazov’s clientistic-paternalist 
rule exacerbates regionalization and suppresses any political participation beyond the president’s 
tolerance. 
International Cooperation  
In general, international cooperation is afforded relatively high importance in the region. All the 
countries are more or less tightly integrated within the system of international organizations. 
However, there are considerable differences in their orientation and motivation regarding 
international cooperation. Overall within the region, the focus on international cooperation is 
driven by economic concerns. Armenia, Georgia, Mongolia and recently Ukraine use the tools of 
international relations to advance toward the twin goals of democracy and a market economy. 
However, on the whole, political leaders in the rest of the region have not employed these tools to 
promote democratization and have used them only marginally to implement market reforms. 
Consequently, relations with international forums and institutions focused on economic concerns 
fare better.  
By contrast, relations between most of the region’s state leaders and institutions such as the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are tense. Since the “Rose 
Revolution”, skepticism of international NGOs has also increased. Active in the “Rose Revolution”, 
the Soros Foundation and its affiliated Open Society Institute have come under scrutiny in the 
countries where they operate or will shortly be obliged to discontinue their work (Kazakhstan), if 
they have not already been forced to shut down their national agencies (Uzbekistan).  
As a rule, the region’s economically weak countries receive higher scores here because they are 
utterly dependent on international assistance. This assistance is used in part for reform 
processes, particularly in Georgia, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. The 
first four aforementioned countries and Ukraine are considered the most reliable partners. Large 
and resource-rich, Russia and Kazakhstan act from a position of perceived strength on the 
international stage, present themselves as reliable partners in economic contexts, manage 
without support from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, and 
reject criticism of their human rights violations, democratic deficits and weak rule of law as 
intolerable interference. Russia continues with great effort to maintain its role as hegemonic 
power in the region. Yet its influence is on the decline, as the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine 
and the end of the Akayev era in Kyrgyzstan suggest.  
In spite of numerous initiatives and efforts for a revival, regional and multilateral cooperation are 
still not in high gear or are driven only by the regional power’s interests. For example, the most 
effective form of multilateral cooperation at present, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), is a product of Russian and Chinese initiative. 
Conclusion  
The dynamics of development mentioned may be sustained through the next period to be 
reviewed. Georgia and Ukraine have seized the opportunity to begin a new era. The new 
leadership in both countries have formulated ambitious reform agendas; their implementation will 
soon become the measure of the leaders’ performance. The population’s patience will depend 
primarily on the fight against corruption, appreciable growth and—in the case of Georgia—the 
integration of breakaway regions. 
Results of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006 for CIS and Mongolia  
 
The "color" revolutions have already cast their shadow on upcoming elections to be held from 
2006 to 2008. In Russia, much jockeying for the position of President Putin’s successor is 
anticipated—if Putin complies with the constitution’s term limit. Presidential elections are to be 
held in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: these elections will 
show whether these countries can improve upon their more or less poor reputation in holding 
democratic elections, or if the series of revolutions following electoral fraud will continue. It 
appears unlikely at the moment that a peaceful revolution in Uzbekistan will bring an end to the 
Karimov regime.  
In the economic sector, the resource-rich countries will have to prepare for a weakening of the 
boom in case of falling prices on world markets. This could reveal the extent to which the region’s 
strong economies are structurally prepared to endure crises. For the economically weaker 
countries, the challenges of attracting investment to create jobs and to increase their capacity for 
action so as to maintain infrastructure, education and health care will continue.  
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